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I. INTRODUCTION
What will copyright law look like in a decade or two? Prophecy, it is said,
was given to the fools, but I dare to predict that the law will not change
significantly during that period. This prediction is based on an historical
analysis of the evolution of copyright law, and an analysis of the major events
that have created a significant "paradigm shift" in its basic conceptions over the
years.' This prediction is therefore based on an inductive methodology,
accepted as a logical measurement, notwithstanding its inherent limitations. 2
The questions concerning the future of copyright law are understandable:
Copyright law was born in the wake of a technological revolution-the
invention of print in Europe-which enabled the mass dissemination of
information.3  The technological changes, combined with other factors,
triggered profound social, economic, and cultural change. 4 In our times, digital
technology-especially the internet, with its potential for mass dissemination of
information-has catalyzed similarly profound societal developments.5 In light
of the current technological revolution, which has created a veritable utopia
with respect to the accessibility of information, the question is whether the time
has come to rethink the fundamentals of copyright law in order to adapt the law
to contemporary needs. One of the most challenged fundamentals in that
respect is the basic perception of copyright as a property right and the scope of
its exceptions and limitations. 6 This profound debate has peaked in recent years
1 For a thorough analysis of methodologies for examining the evolution of legal rules, see
Simon F. Deakin, Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches (Univ. of Cambridge
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 41, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934738.
2 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739) (criticizing the use of induction, in
order to reach logically scientific conclusions, as tautological reasoning).
3 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 79-121 (1968); MARK
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); JOHN FEATHER,
PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND PoLITICs: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN (1994);
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT's HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIALJUKEBox 37-
77 (1994); BENJAMIN KAPLAN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT:
REPUBLISHED (AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) (2005); GILLIAN DAVIES,
COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 20 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2d ed. 2002); Carla Hesse, The Rise
ofIntellectualProperty, 700 B.C -A.D. 2000:An Idea in the Balance, 131 DAEDALUS 26, 30 (2002).
4 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 79-121; ROSE, supra note 3; FEATHER, supra note 3;
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 37-77; KAPLAN & MILLER, supra note 3; DAVIES, supra note 3, at 20;
Hesse, supra note 3, at 26, 30.
5 JAMES SLEVIN, THE INTERNET AND SOCIETY 72-87 (2000); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 105
(2006).
6 For the view that copyright should be shaped as an independent category, free from
principles and terminology of property rights, see for example: Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
2012] 3
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in the wake of a series of court decisions, national and international legislative
initiatives, and intense and lively academic discourse. Battles are being
conducted on all of these fronts, giving rise to the notion that we are currently
in the midst of the "copyright wars."7
Nonetheless, technology is not the only component required to trigger legal
change, despite its tremendous impact.8 Other factors, such as shifts in the
economic, political, and social settings, also play an essential role.9
Contextualizing these insights into the issue at hand poses the question of
whether the changes in the settings of the realm of copyright law are of the kind
which potentially set the stage for a legal shift. The proposition offered here is
that the core economic, political, and social interests from which copyright law
emerged are still basically the same. History reveals that, from the very outset,
copyright law was the product of a bitter struggle between private and public
interests, reflecting a clash between economic and social goals. The private-
economic/public-social dichotomy is evolving, gaining more "players" to each
side of the equation. However the basic clash of interests is repetitive. 0 It is
Authorsh and the Rhetone of Property, 75 TEX. L. REv. 873, 902 (1997); Peter S. Menell, The Property
Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Properly: True Love or Doomed Relaionsh?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
713, 743 (2007). See also Orit Fischman Afori, Fkxible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in
Copyrght Lw, 29 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2011).
For the more conservative view, classifying copyright as a property right, see Richard A.
Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyrght Low, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1
(2005); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commeriaking Inventions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 697 (2001); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Propery and the Mythologies
of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).
7 WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 1-41 (2009). See also Jessica
Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002); Jessica Litman, The Poliics of
Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (2009); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copght
Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004).
9 Merritt Roe Smith, Technological Determinism in American Culture, in DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE
HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 1, 1-25 (Merritt Roe Smith & Leo
Marx eds., 1994); Flis Henwood, Sally Wyatt, Nod Miller & Peter Senker, Cridcal Perspectives on
Technologies, In/Equalities and the Information Society, in TECHNOLOGY AND IN/EQUAUTY:
QUESTIONING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 1, 8-12 (Sally Wyatt, Flis Henwood, Nod Miller &
Peter Senker eds., 2000).
9 Yaron Ezrahi, Technology and the Illusion of the Escape From Poliics, in TECHNOLOGY, PESSIMISM,
AND POSTMODERNISM 29, 29-36 (Yaron Ezrahi, Everett Mendelsohn & Howard P. Segal eds.,
1994); Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law, General Introduction, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 1, 1-14 (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds.,
1992); Saskia Sassen, Towards a Sociology of Information Technology, in THE SOCIAL STUDY OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY: INNOVATION, ACTORS, AND CONTEXTS 77,
77-79 (Chrisanthi Avgerou, Claudio Ciborra & Frank Land eds., 2004).
10 See Orit Fischman-Afori, Copyrght Low in Historical Perspective: Old Wine in New Bottles, in LAW
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 321 (Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin Koren ed.) (Hebrew).
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THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT LAW 2
therefore doubtful whether the time is ripe for a paradigm shift in copyright
law.
Furthermore, a look into history of Anglo-American copyright law suggests
another proposition: Major legal changes, ones that created a paradigm shift,
were created through national or international legislation, and not by courts.
Courts develop law using the common law mechanisms, on a case by case basis,
causing rules to evolve in a continual process of adaptation to the changing
surroundings. From an evolutionary perspective, however, revolutionary
developments have thus far been engendered by regulatory bodies.
Accordingly, the results of the current copyright wars will be a function of the
identity of the agents for change: international bodies, Congress, or courts. The
impetus for the current copyright wars is the attempt to challenge the basic
perception of copyright as a property right, and the magnitude of the challenge
suggests that changes-if any-can only be achieved by (international)
legislation. However, the current wielders of political and economic power
have thus been unwilling to endorse a shift in the basic model of copyright as
vesting exclusivity to its owner. This leaves the courtroom as the battle arena in
which pro-public/social interest holders can pursue their cause. But the courts,
as explained, lack the ability to bring about a significant and immediate tilt of
the balance of interests. Therefore, the conclusion is that given the current
status quo in the private-economic/public-social equilibrium, significant
evolutionary (and much less so revolutionary) developments do not seem likely
in the near future.
Part II of this Article describes the current copyright wars, demonstrating
the depth of the conceptual challenges currently confronting copyright law.
Part III presents a synoptic history of copyright law, emphasizing the nexus of
interests that fashioned the legal mechanism from its inception. Part IV
describes the role of international copyright treaties in blocking further
development of the basic doctrine of copyright law. Part V presents an analysis
of the evolutionary mechanisms in copyright law, enabling an attempt to predict
a number of future trends. Part VI concludes.
II. THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT WARS
The digital and technological developments of the past twenty years have
challenged copyright law in the most fundamental sense. The challenge finds
expression in both the conceptual and ideological debate over the goals of
copyright law and in the economic clash between the holders of a variety of
interests. These debates and clashes, manifested both in the theoretical and
2012] 35
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political arenas, have become known as "copyright wars.""t Indeed the crisis is
acute: In the current information-based society the question is whether control
over the dissemination of works should be strengthened or removed, and how
to structure the incentives offered to the relevant industries producing
copyrighted works. These and many other questions presented by the current
technological age are all offshoots of the core issue of whether current
copyright law, based on a property right model, is still the appropriate regime
for achieving its goals.12
The major issues and cases that have captured the copyright community's
attention over the last two years demonstrate, in a nutshell, the essence of the
copyright wars. The recurrent clashes are between copyright holders attempting
to strengthen their ability to combat the free circulation of their works, while
internet intermediaries' attempt to relax the grip of copyright exclusivity in
order to promote their business model, which flourishes with the ever-
increasing accessibility and availability of copyrighted works. In that respect,
internet intermediaries often function as an agent of the general public's interest
in use of copyrighted works. Four examples will be mentioned; two of them
are court cases-the Google Books Library Project3 and Viacom v. Youtube,14 and
the other two are legislative initiatives-the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)
bill,' which follows the Protect IP Act (PIPA) bill,16 and the international Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).17
11 See supra note 7.
12 Abraham Drassinower claims that the gap between the copyright maximalists and copyright
minimalists in the North American discourse is not so wide since both parties adhere to the
instrumentalist approach. If natural rights argumentation was to be taken into account, then the
minimalists' position would encounter greater complexities. See Abraham Drassinower, A Note on
Incentives, Paghts and the Public Domain in Copyngbt Law, 86 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1869, 1870-71
(2011).
Yet, it should be noted that even under a natural right argumentation, copyright would not
necessarily be defined as a property right, but rather as a mechanism for providing "adequate
remuneraton" for authors and creators. See Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 17, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 at 3; 35th Sess. (12 January 2006). In
other words, it is uncertain whether a natural law position would necessarily support the
maximalist wing in the instrumentalist discourse.
13 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
14 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
15 Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
16 S. 968, 112th Cong. 2011.
17 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i-proper
ty/pdfs/actal105_en.pdf (last visited May 15, 2012).
236 [Vol. 19:231
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A. THE CASES OF GOOGLE BOOKS LIBRARY PROJECT AND VIACOM V. YOUTUBE
The Google Books Library Project, creating a searchable database
containing the full text of every book held by several major libraries, including
copyrighted books, 8 is an example of an attempt to challenge the proprietary
model of copyright law.'9 Several groups have brought legal challenges against
Google, alleging that the project violates copyright law.20 The Author's Guild
filed a class action suit against Google, claiming that the wholesale copying of
books without permission, and displaying snippets to those searching Google
Books, was an infringement of copyright.21 Google claimed that the fair use
doctrine applied, stressing the availability of an "opt out" mechanism, in which
there is no need to acquire initial permission to use the work, despite the
proprietary nature of the copyright.22  The call for mass digitization
acknowledges the existence of a different mechanism, in which copyright
owners would be required to actively exclude themselves from the project.23
The parties reached a settlement, according to which Google could continue
with its project and a Books Rights Registry would be established to track the
use of works and provide royalties to copyright holders. Google agreed to pay
$125 million for establishing this kind of framework, and the authors would no
longer be able to sue Google for infringement, unless they opted out of the
agreement by 2012.24
The court did not approve the settlement on several grounds. Most
importantly, the court rejected the "opt out" mechanism as contradicting the
18 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (noting that the Google Books Library Project has
"created an electronic database of books" and "made text available for online searching').
19 See genera/f id. (describing the uniqueness of the Google Books Library Project).
20 See id. ("[Inn 2005, certain authors and publishers brought this class action ... charging
Google with copyright infringement.").
21 See id. at 673 ("[Plaintiffs] contend that the case is about the scanning of books and the
display of 'snippets.'").
22 See id. at 670-71 ("Google's principal defense is fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act").
23 See Brief of Defendant in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Amended Settlement
Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV
8136) 2010 WL 563049 (arguing, "The Settlement serves this most fundamental purpose of
copyright law by making published books widely available to the reading public... . At the same
time, the [settlement] permits Right holders to retain control over the use of their
works . .. including prohibiting or restricting Google's display or distribution of the works.").
24 See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (observing that "class members who fail to opt out
will be deemed to have released their rights even as to future infringing conduct); Antone
Gonsalves, Google Reaches $125 Milon Settkment In Book Copyrght Lawsuits, INFORMATON WEEK,
Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/google/211601094.
2012] 7
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core model of current copyright law. 25 The settlement, which would have been
binding upon any author who did not opt out, settled disputes relating to parties
beyond the actual parties to the litigation, and therefore, in the court's view, had
no legitimacy from a strict copyright law perspective. 26 Yet, the court did not
discuss the applicability of the fair use doctrine in the case, which remained,
therefore, Google's main defense.27
The Google Books Library Project reflects an attempt to increase the
accessibility of copyrighted works, even if made by a for-profit intermediary at
the expense of proprietary control over works.28 The court's ruling reflects its
inability to take a significant theoretical leap in the development of copyright
law within a common law mechanism. In the court's view, quantum leaps of
this kind, which create an entirely new mechanism, are tasks reserved for
Congress.29
Another recently challenged activity of a major internet intermediary is that
of YouTube, which serves as a platform for uploading and downloading files
containing films. Viacom, which holds copyright in many film and television
properties, sued YouTube on the grounds of indirect liability for the uploading
and downloading of files containing works it owned, thus infringing its
copyrights.30 The trial court refused to establish liability on YouTube's part for
such infringing activity.31 In order to establish such indirect liability, it said, it
must be shown that YouTube had concrete knowledge of each infringing file,
and a general knowledge of the fact that there is a problem of infringing activity
is not sufficient to establish liability.32 Since YouTube is following the "notice
and takedown" mechanism codified by the DMCA, the court lacks the authority
to impose extensive obligations on internet intermediaries. 33 An appeal is
pending.
25 See Authorr Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682 (recognizing that, "it is incongruous with the
purpose of the copyright laws to place the onus on copyright owners to come forward to protect
their rights... .').
26 See id. (noting that "there are likely to be many authors-including those whose works will
not be scanned by Google until some years in the future-who will simply not know to come
forward').
27 See id. at 670-71 ("Google's principal defense is fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act.'.
2 See id. at 670 (recognizing that "[b]ooks will become more accessible." However, "[m]illions
of the books ... were still under copyright, and Google did not obtain copyright permission to
scan the books.").
29 Id. at 677.
30 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D. N.Y. 2010).
31 Id at 519.
32 Id. at 523.
33 Id. at 525.
238 [Vol. 19:231
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The Viacom v. YouTube case reflects the same attempt to enhance
accessibility of copyrighted works, even if made by a for-profit intermediary, at
the expense of proprietary control over works. The court's holding reflects an
attempt to exercise its powers by way of the common law mechanism to
develop the existing doctrine of indirect liability so as to limit the proprietary
power of copyright owners.34 The indirect liability doctrine does not relate
specifically to the degree of mental awareness required to establish liability,
which leaves room for the courts to formulate a modest ruling that does not
create a paradigm shift in terms of the perception of copyright as a property
right.
B. THE SOPA AND ACTA INITIATIVES
The other two examples demonstrate the current copyright wars from a
political perspective. The clash between copyright owners and internet
intermediaries (who, as explained, serve as agents of the general public interest
in use of copyrighted works) moved to Congress. On October 26, 2011, the
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) Bill was presented in Congress.35 The SOPA
Bill proposes to enact a series of measures which would enable copyright
owners to prevent infringing activity on the internet, including extensive
measures that could be adopted against internet intermediaries overseas. 36 The
scope of indirect liability would be expanded, and internet intermediaries would
be required to act as copyright enforcement gatekeepers, instead of users'
agents.37 The SOPA bill, therefore, reflects an escalation of the copyright wars,
since it attempts to enact a doctrinal "jump," extending protection over
copyrighted works, which could not be achieved through the gradual process of
common law.38 However, vast public opposition to these legislative initiatives
has steadily grown, and in January 2012 this opposition was expressed on an
international level with unusual demonstrations and protests made by major
internet intermediaries, such as Google and Wikipedia. These acts brought the
34 Id. at 529.
3s H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://udiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/12%2
OHR%203261.pdf (last visited May 15, 2012).
36 Id.
37 For example, see id. at 103 (internet intermediaries would need to qualify an in-house agent
who would deal with notifications of infringing activities by third parties on the internet and
would be required to comply within five days with a series of measures that would be adopted
against such infringers).
38 See Mark A. Lemley, David S. Levine & David G. Post, Don't Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 34 (2011), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=197898 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
2012] 39
9
Fischman-Afori: The Evolution of Copyright Law and Inductive Speculations as to I
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2012
240 J. INTELL PROP. L [Vol. 19:231
copyright wars into the public eye, and the battle for public opinion was
intensified.3 9
Another example, demonstrating the copyright wars on an international
political level, is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). On
October 1, 2011, this highly controversial multilateral agreement, concerning
enforcement of intellectual property rights, was adopted by eight countries:
Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and
the United States.0 ACTA introduced a series of mechanisms aimed at
bolstering both enforcement and deterrence. 41 ACTA was criticized for both
the lack of transparency in the negotiation process and for its potentially severe
ramifications for the integrity of the existing international intellectual property
regime.42 Some commentators have described ACTA as a "country club
agreement," open only to a select few developed countries with strong
economies, while the rest of the world remains subordinate to the strong
countries' interests via bilateral agreements.43 The background for the ACTA
parties' need for a new mechanism to strengthen enforcement of intellectual
property rights is the endorsement of a countervailing interest of developing
countries in the WIPO and WTO agenda. This interest-known as the
39 See Matt Peckham, Did It Work? 'Day After' Resuls ofthe SOPA, PIPA Blackout, TIME, http://tec
hland.time.com/2012/01/19/did-it-work-day-after-results-of-the-sopa-pipa-blackout. The New
York Times referred to this battle as "a fight between the old economy versus the new economy."
Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Pirazy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests-piracy-bill-and-2-key-senators-ch
ange-course.html?_r=1&hp. The White House responded to the protest by an announcement that
it would not support SOPA, but nonetheless called for a comprehensive solution to online piracy
that would take freedom of speech into consideration. Macon Phillips, ObamaAdministration Respond
to We the People Petitions on SOPA and Onkne Pirag, WHTE HOUSE, Jan. 14, 2012, http://www.whiteh
ouse.gov/blog/2012/01/14/obama-administration-responds-we-people-petitions-sopa-and-online-
piracy.
40 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited May 15, 2012).
41 For example, with respect to remedies in the copyright law arena, Article 9 (3) of ACTA
provides that
each Party shall also establish or maintain a system that provides for one or
more of the following: (a) pre-established damages; or (b) presumptions for
determining the amount of damages sufficient to compensate the right holder
for the harm caused by the infringement; or (c) at least for copyright, additional
damages.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 9, Dec. 3, 2010, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/po
licy/economy/iLproperty/pdfs/acta1 105..en.pdf.
42 Peter Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Poitics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 16 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abtract=1953899.
43 See, e.g., id; Daniel Gervais, China-Measures Afecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Propery Rights, 103 AM.J. INT'LL. 549, 555 (2009).
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"Development Agenda"-calls for a limitation on the scope of intellectual
property rights.44 The clash of interests between developed and developing
countries created a deadlock in these two organizations, preventing the
introduction of any further agreements. 45 This resulted in the need for an
alternative international forum.46 This development in* the international political
economy of intellectual property rights reflects the depth and scope of the
current copyright wars, which is not only a war between copyright owners and
users, but also a political battle between countries.47
Nevertheless, a deeper look into the history of copyright law reveals that the
copyright wars have actually been going on for four hundred years. Indeed, the
current war, stimulated by the social, economic, and technological changes
brought on by the internet, stresses the general public's interest in free
circulation of information. But, this core interest is not new in the copyright
arena. From its inception copyright law has had to strike compromises between
clashing interests-the interest of protecting works and the interest of allowing
freer and more liberal access to works. The first part of this Article presents a
brief synopsis of the evolution of modern copyright law, highlighting its
perennial core structure of interests.
III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY COPYRIGHT LAW
The past decade has seen the flourishing of the historical research of
intellectual property law.48 The reason for this phenomenon is that
44 See Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for
WIPO, WIPO General Assembly, Thirty-First (15th Extraordinary) Session, Geneva, September
25 to October 4, 2004, WO/GA/31/11 Add; Inter-Sessional Intergovernmental Meeting On A
Development Agenda for WIPO, Second Session, Geneva, June 20 to 22, 2005, IIM/2/10/Prov.
2, Sec. 20; Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001.
45 WTO.ORG, Members Confront Doha Road Deadlock with Pledge to Seek Meaningful Way
Out, Apr. 29, 2011 (statement of the WTO General Director, of April 2011, on the failure of the
Doha negotiations on adoption of the Development Agenda into the WTO Agreements). As to
the attempts to implement the Development Agenda as one of WIPO's instruments, in 2005 a
resolution on the need to examine the changes required was adopted. See Inter-Sessional
Intergovernmental Meeting On A Development Agenda For WIPO, Second Session, Geneva,
June 20 to 22, 2005, IIM/2/10/Prov. 2, Sec. 20. However, since then, no operative measures
have been adopted.
46 Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (And Now Open) Fears ofACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 988 (2011).
47 Id. at 979-80.
48 Peter K. Yu, Intellectual P"perty at a Crssmads: Why Histog Matters, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 2-
3 (2004). See also MARTIN KRETSCHMER, LIONEL BENTLY & RONAN DEAZLEY, INTRODUCTION:
THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT HISTORY PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT 1 (R. Deazley, M. Kretschmer & L. Bently ed., 2010) (claiming that "copyright
12012]
11
Fischman-Afori: The Evolution of Copyright Law and Inductive Speculations as to I
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2012
J. INTELL PROP. L
understanding historical narratives assists us in confronting new ones,49 just as
the past sheds light on the present.o The history of copyright law teaches us
that a number of basic motivations are inherent in the law, among them are the
personal and economic interests of authors, the economic interests of
entrepreneurs, the social-economic interests of the public, and the political-
social-economic interest of the government.5' All the same, over the years the
evolving dynamic has created a tendency in which the public interest is
weakened and the economic interest of the copyright entrepreneurial industry
acquires primacy.5 2
A. GENESIS OF THE COPYRIGHT-A MIXTURE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
INTERESTS
The conventional understanding is that the birth of modern copyright law is
linked to the invention of print in the fifteenth century in Europe: Printing
allowed mass dissemination of information and ideas contained in the literary
medium, and consequently the governing authority sought to regulate such
activity. 53 This early regulation was effected by a mechanism of issuing permits
to print, known as the system of "privileges."5 The motivation for regulating
the printing industry, however, is more disputed: Some stress reasons relating to
censorship, whereas others stress "civil" reasons, aimed at promoting
economic, social, and political ends.55 The latter, the "civil" reasons, included
history had been the subject of intense and sustained study during several periods in that past').
49 As it is with respect to all historical research, see KEITH JENKINS, RE-THINKING HISTORY 22
(1991).
5 RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT-HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE 6-8 (2006).
51 See Fischman-Afori, supra note 10. For a similar insight with respect to patent law, see Susan
K. Sell, Intellectual Propery and Pubi Pohiy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 267, 321 (2004).
52 CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE NEW ENCLOSURE? 1-6 (Otto Holman et al. eds., 2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Sbfting:
The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 98 (2004); Andrea Koury Menescal,
Those Behind the TRIPS Agreement: The Influence of the ICC and the AIPPI on International Intellectual
Property Decisions, INTELL. PROP. Q. 155 (2005).
53 PATTERSON, supra note 3.
5 Hesse, supra note 3, at 30.
5s DAVIES, supra note 3, at 10, 31; PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 23 (stressing that censorship
pervaded the dissemination of information even prior to the printing press). See also Oren Bracha,
Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 126-27 (2005) (unpublished
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various goals, which would currently be viewed as an attempt to promote
"public" interests along with other "private" ones.5 6  For example, at the
system's inception the governing authorities would issue a privilege to a specific
person to print a specific book for a limited time, and had full discretion to
extend or terminate that permit.57 The aim of this early privilege system was to
enable the existence of the newly arrived printing industry. Granting exclusivity
would enable the sale of a number of books sufficient to refund the enormous
investments involved in printing machinery. In other words, granting
exclusivity was intended to provide the incentives needed for the existence of
the flourishing industry.58 On the other hand, the privileges system was
formulated in a way that sought to promote other social and economic
objectives, such as a sufficient supply of books, good quality printing,59 and the
monitoring of the market price of books.60
May and Sell describe at length this social-economic perception of the
privilege system in Venice during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 61 Venice
was a prosperous duchy in which printing had become a major source of
income.62 Unregulated printing led to a surplus of books, resulting in printers
going bankrupt and becoming dependent on creditors. The first privilege
system was thus established to protect the printing industry in Venice and to
stabilize the market.63 Privileges were only issued for a period of up to five
years, and were restricted to particular categories of books.M Privileges did not
confer the status of a proprietary asset that could be inherited, but were
regarded rather as personal, non-transferable permits.65 The privilege system
spread to all parts of Italy, then to Germany, and finally to England, where the
first privilege was issued in 1504.66 As the printing industry became more
prosperous, additional regulation was required in order to realize its original
goals. Privileges were issued only for new books, and were withdrawn if the
56 CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITCAL
HISTORY 43, 109 (2006); Bracha, supra note 55, at 132, 151-52.
s7 MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 56, 65-71; Hesse, supra note 3, at 30.
58 FEATHER, supra note 3, at 10; KAPLAN & MILLER, supra note 3, at 2; ROSE, supra note 3, at 10;
DAVIES, supra note 3, at 21; PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 21; MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 66. See
also Hesse, supra note 3, at 40.
59 MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 68-69, 89. See also Bracha, supra note 55, at 126.
60 MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 65-69. See also PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 23.
61 MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 65-71.
62 Id. at 56, 65-71. See also Hesse, supra note 3, at 30; Bracha, supra note 55, at 119.
63 MAY & SELL, srupra note 56, at 56. See also FEATHER, supra note 3, at 10-11.
6 See supra note 62.
65 MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 56.
6 Id. at 87-88. See also Hesse, supra note 3, at 30; DAVIES, Supra note 3, at 20-21.
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book was not printed within one year of the issuance of the privilege.67
Moreover, the burgeoning profitability of the book industry was inevitably
accompanied by counterfeiting free-riding conduct. Copying of this nature was
viewed as a breach of the public order and was therefore sanctioned by a fine
that was payable to the authorities.68
Therefore, from its birth, the regulation of the early printing industry
reflected an attempt to create a legal order that took various dynamic and
evolving interests into consideration, translating them into a balanced legal
formula intended to promote the public's benefit while protecting private
economic interests. 69
With the passage of years the privileges were centralized by powerful bodies,
which eventually resulted in the emergence of a private monopoly that
controlled all privileges. This was the situation in England, where in 1557 the
printers' guild, known as the "Stationers' Company," received an exclusive
privilege to print books.70 This privilege was exercised exclusively by Stationers'
Company members who had received a permit to print a book from the
Company.7' In time, the members of the guild began to trade these permits
among themselves. The commercial nature of the stationery document had
turned its perception into a "right" to copy a book, instead of an
"administrative permit."72 Many other characteristics of the entries contributed
to such perception: The entries were issued regularly and uniformly, were
transferable, and were not dependent on the Stationers' Company's discretion
or mercy. Therefore, holders of such entries regarded themselves as being
entitled to copy books, namely holding a "copyright." In the course of trade,
toward the end of the seventeenth century, a group of four members of the
guild bought all entries, and thus acquired a true monopoly in the book printing
industry in England. Consequently, the price of books significantly increased
while their supply and quality decreased.73
The privilege system focused on regulating the printers of books, who had
the status of an entrepreneur investing in the production of books. The author
67 MAY & SEL., supra note 56, at 69.
68 Id. at 68-69.
69 Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Propery and Pubic Poey in Historical Perpective: Contestation and
Settlement, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 267, 267-68 (2004).
70 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 28-29; KAPLAN & MIULER, supra note 3, at 3.
71 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 51-63; KAPLAN & M.LLER, supra note 3, at 4; FEATHER, supra
note 3, at 18.
72 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 51-53; KAPLAN & MILLER, supra note 3, at 4; FEATHER, supra
note 3, at 18. See also Hesse, supra note 3, at 30.
73 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 47.
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was not part of this scheme, having no protection or special status. 74 Authors
usually sold their works for a lump sum (or were forced to seek out a patron).7
Some scholars have opined that authors enjoyed limited benefits, such as
contractual royalties or other on-going relations with the printer,76 but these
benefits were not officially recognized by the privilege system. This situation
changed however towards the end of the seventeenth century when there was a
surge in the demand for secular writing.77 This new demand established writing
as a recognized profession and writers gradually gained recognition for both
their societal importance and their justified entitlement to earn a living.78 This
moment in history has been identified as giving rise to the birth of the modern
author, who worked independently and was motivated by his aspiration to
freely express himself.79 Ostensibly, the printers could have been expected to
combat the emergence of the modern author, as the holder of a competing
interest that would encroach upon their profits. The printers however adopted
a far more sophisticated strategy. As Patterson, Jaszi, and Woodmansee
concluded, the printers took advantage of the nascent concept of the modem
author, realizing that demanding the recognition of an author's property right in
his writing would actually promote their own business. While the property right
might initially vest in the authors, it would inevitably be soon transferred to the
printers, thus enabling them to increase their control over the market and
enhance their profits.80
B. THE STATUTE OF ANNE-THE FIRST ENACTED FORMULATION OF
INTERESTS
By the end of the seventeenth century, the privilege system was being
criticized by all the relevant sectors: Authors demanded a property right in their
writings, increasing numbers of printers were demanding the right to freely
participate in the printing industry (which meant the abolishment of the
London guild), and the general public demanded a reduction in the price of
74 Id. at 79-80; ROSE, supra note 3, at 16-17; Hesse, supra note 3, at 31; DAVIES, supra note 3, at
21.
75 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 79-80; ROSE, supra note 3, at 16-17; Hesse, sfpra note 3, at 31;
DAVIES, supra note 3, at 21.
76 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 69-71; Bracha, supra note 55, at 159.
77 Hesse, supra note 3, at 32.
78 Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Efect: Recoveing Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 279, 280-82 (1992).
79 ROSE, supra note 3, at 37-41.
8 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 71; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theog of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
'Authorship," 1991 DuKE L.J. 455; Woodmansee, supra note 78.
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books, an increase in their supply, and the creation of a market not governed by
censorship.8' Some of these demands also found support in John Locke's labor
theory, which rapidly made deep inroads throughout Europe.82 The theoretical
justification for vesting ownership in books with their creators significantly
empowered the civil protest against the privileges system.83 The combination
of all these pressures culminated in the abolishment of the privilege system, in
1695.8 The ground has been laid for a new, modern copyright act, based on a
conception of "rights."
The first act was adopted by Queen Anne in 1709, and was titled "An Act
for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times herein
mentioned."8 5 The title of the act reflects its essence: The act provided a
statutory anchor for copyright, consisting of both instrumental justification and
adherence to the Lockean doctrine of the author's entitlement to his works.86
This newly enacted formulation was the product of a new balance between
political and economic powers, and demands that were the product of
philosophical developments.87
The Statute of Anne, for the first time, vested copyright with the author.88
However, the statute was mainly aimed at recognizing and promoting the
public's interest in the abolition of the printing monopoly and in enhanced
access to books.89 Accordingly, the Statute of Anne limited the period of
copyright to a maximum of twenty-eight years.90 In order to break the London
guild's monopoly, the obligation to register the copyright with the Stationers'
Company registry was abolished.9' For the public benefit, the statute
established an obligation to deposit copies of all newly published books in the
81 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 47; DAVIES, supra note 3, at 8-11; FEATHER, supra note 3, at 50-
51, 65; Bracha, supra note 55, at 150, 178-80.
82 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689).
83 DAVIES, supra note 3, at 11; ROSE, supra note 3, at 32-33.
84 DAVIES, supra note 3, at 8; Hesse, supra note 3, at 37.
85 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19 (1709) (Eng.); PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 145. Carla Hesse
has mentioned a slightly different title, as following. A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning and for
Securing the Pmpery of Copies of Books to the Righ ful Owners Thereof See Hesse, supra note 3, at 37.
8 DAVIES, supra note 3, at 13-17; Hesse, supra note 3, at 37.
87 MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 73.
88 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19 (1709) (Eng.).
89 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 143; MAY & SELL, supra note 56, at 92-93, 97; DAVIES, sura
note 3, at 13-17; DEAZLEY, supra note 50, at 13-14. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literay Pmpery in Revolutionay France and America, in OF AuTHORs AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS
ON COPYRIGHT LAw 131, 137 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994).
90 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.19, sec. XI (1709) (Eng.).
91 Id. sec. III.
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royal library as well as in the libraries of various universities.92  Most
importantly, to prevent monopolistic pricing of books, the Statute of Anne
established a legal mechanism conferring the Lord Chancellor and other
officials with the irrevocable authority to review complaints against
unreasonable prices of books and to determine the appropriate price.93
Nevertheless, it seems that the Statute of Anne's impact was not immediate, and
market failures remained since the publishers of books succeeded in retaining
their monopolistic power.94
The eighteenth century further witnessed ideological debates over whether
creative works should be treated as property, how to distinguish between
tangible and intangible assets, and how to maintain free circulation of ideas for
the sake of the public's well being.95 These debates did not remain in the ivory
towers of high society. For example, in 1736, the Society for the
Encouragement of Learning was established in England, and militated against
the publishers' de facto continuing monopoly.96 The demand for freedom of
speech and accessibility of content within the copyright system also found
expression in the courtroom.97 The most important case of that period,
challenging the underpinnings of copyright law, was Donaldson v. Beckett, in
which the House of Lords abolished the common law copyright, protecting
works beyond the period specified by the Act. 98 This ruling temporarily halted
the publishers' persistent attempts to promote their market power, both in
Parliament and in court.99
The Statute of Anne greatly influenced the early development of copyright
in colonial America,100 and finally, along with the ruling of the Donaldson v.
Beckett case, prompted the adoption of the American constitutional clause
addressing intellectual property rights in 1787.101 Three years later, in 1790, the
92 Id.
93 Id. sec. V.
94 Hesse, supra note 3, at 33-35.
95 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 153.
96 Id.
97 Hesse, supra note 3, at 38-39; PArrERSON, supra note 3, at 151-80; Bracha, supra note 55, at
202-34.
98 Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.); 2 Brown's Parl. Cases 129 (Eng.).
99 PA=ERSON, supra note 3, at 154-72.
100 See New York Copyright Statute (1786), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22us_1786a%22 (last visited Apr. 15,2012); Georgia Copyright
Statue (1786), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/
%22us_1 786%22 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
101 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See PArERSON, supra note 3, at 192-96; Hesse, supra note 3, at
38; Ginsburg, supra note.89, at 131.
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first American Federal Copyright Act was enacted, adopting a formula for
balancing conflicting interests similar to the one adopted in the Statute of
Anne,102 the principal difference between them being the instrumentalist goal of
the American act. 03  The United States Supreme Court approved the
instrumentalist approach in the seminal case of Wheaton v. Peters, handed down
in 1834. Similar to the ruling in Donaldson v. Beckett, in Wheaton v. Peters, the
Supreme Court held that copyright is an ex lege right aimed at serving public
goals, thus abolishing common law copyright.'o4
C. ADDITIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
The first half of the nineteenth century saw the intensification of the debate
in England concerning the most just and appropriate way of regulating the
subject of copyright. 05 Within less than half a century, the Statute of Anne was
replaced twice, first in 1814106 and again in 1842.107
Seville describes the lively public debate in England, which was influenced
by social and political developments of that period. The 1814 Act granted
copyright protection to a work for the length of its author's life. This triggered
a struggle between public interest supporters, who sought to shorten the period
and the economic interest holders, who battled to further extend the period of
protection. 08 The public protest against the tendency to fortify copyright led to
the establishment of activist organizations, such as the Society for the Diffusion
of Useful Knowledge, 0 9 which tried to convince the public of the chilling effect
of such legislation in terms of the public interest in the advancement and
dissemination of knowledge and education. 10 During that period, primarily
between the years of 1837 through 1841, a slew of bills were introduced in
Parliament, each of which fanned the flames of public debate over the wisdom
of extending protection over copyrighted works."' One of these bills,
102 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (the title of the Act was also similar to the Statute
of Anne: "An act for encouragement of learning by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.").
103 PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 198.
104 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
105 CATHERINE SEVILLE, LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM IN EARLY VIcTORIAN ENGLAND: THE
FRAMING OF THE 1842 COPYRIGHT AcT 1-32 (1999).
106 Copyright Act of 1814.
107 Copyright Act of 1842.
108 SEVILLE, supra note 105, at 6-8, 111-48.
1o9 Id. at 105.
110 Id. at 21-22, 105-07.
M11 Id. at 6.
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introduced in 1837, suggested extending the protection for works to sixty years
after the death of the author, while simultaneously granting a fair dealing
exemption that would allow uses promoting the public's interest.1 2 One of the
greatest opponents of these legislative initiatives was Thomas Macaulay, a
Parliament member, who eventually succeeded in preventing it in the wake of
his seminal parliamentary speech in 1841.113 In that speech, Macaulay declared
copyright as monopolistic, therefore undermining the public interest, and at
best a necessary evil.114 Eventually, the Copyright Act of 1842 extended
copyright protection to only seven years after the author's death, thus
underscoring the importance of public involvement in formulating the sensitive
balance of interests." 5
Seville notes that Macaulay himself concluded that the 1842 Act reflected a
good compromise for all.11 6 In the same vein, Hesse concludes that, until the
middle of the nineteenth century, copyright was perceived as a legal concept
based on a variety of underpinnings and goals, aimed at establishing a
compromise formula which did not crown any particular interest or ideology." 7
The public interest in access to works was combined with the conflicting
economic interests of authors and entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, by the second
half of the nineteenth century the nature of the balance between the competing
interests began to change when the two groups of economic interest holders-
authors and entrepreneurs-joined forces to establish an international
intellectual property regime.118 This move succeeded due to the adoption of the
first two international treaties, which are still the baseline of intellectual
property law: The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883," and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works of 1886 (Berne Convention).120 These two conventions engendered a
tectonic change in the development of intellectual property rights by enabling a
change in the traditional balance so that it favored private economic interests.
112 Id. at 8, 18, 240.
113 Id. at 17, 28.
114 Id. at 31, 62; Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 132. For the full speech, addressed by Eric Flint,
see Eric Flint, Prime Palaver #4, Macaulay on Copynght Law, BAEN (Sept. 1, 2001), http://www.
baen.com/1ibrary/palaver4.htm.
"1s SEVILLE, supra note 105, at 6-9.
116 Id. at 32.
117 Hesse, supra note 3, at 39.
118 Id. at 40; FEATHER, supra note 3, at 180-85.
119 21 U.S.T. 1583.
120 25 U.S.T. 1341.
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IV. THE BERNE CONVENTION-PERPETUATION OF (MIS)CONCEPTIONS
The launch of the Berne Convention is another landmark in the evolution of
copyright law, similar to the Statute of Anne, which profoundly influenced
perceptions of the legal copyright regime. The background for the signing of
the Berne Convention lies in the middle of the nineteenth century, when many
European countries had general laws on copyright, with significant differences
between them with respect to the kinds of work protected, duration of such
protection, recognized rights, restrictions on the exercise of those rights, and
the formalities required.121 Since the exploitation of works was not limited to a
certain territory, the need for an international arrangement for protection of
works outside their original borders became increasingly acute.122 Ricketson
and Ginsburg note that in the pre-Berne era, most European countries regarded
it as neither unfair nor immoral to exploit another country's works without
permission. On the contrary, it was regarded as an act that promoted the
advancement and dissemination of knowledge among the local population.123
This kind of interstate "piracy" became a wide-scale phenomenon, causing
harm primarily to countries such as England, France, and Germany, who each
discovered that their citizens' works were being reprinted at lower prices in
other countries speaking the same language, such as in the United States,
Belgium, and other German speaking countries, respectively.124 The interests of
these countries in the prevention of international "piracy" lead to the
development of early international relations. Ricketson and Ginsburg further
note that the "arguments for and against the protection of foreign authors at
this time were analogous to those which are made today in the context of
developing countries." 25 Nevertheless, in a gradual process, a network of
121 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 8-19 (2d ed. 2006).
122 Id. at 19. However, Bently and Sherman stress that in the mid-nineteenth century, Great
Britain had no interest in joining the new multinational agreement for several reasons, including
the absence of a market failure in England and the fear that such treaty would inhibit a bilateral
agreement with the U.S. See Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Great Britain and the Signing of the Berne
Convention in 1886, 2001 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 48, 311, 315-16, 325.
123 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 121, at 19-20.
124 Id. at 20. At a certain period a system of "courtesy copyright" was developed, in which local
publishers, mainly in the United States, agreed to acquire a license from the copyright owner
overseas and pay royalties for the local printing. This system mainly served the local publishers in
preventing competition by other local publishers, and once an initial investment in the printing of
a book in the U.S. had been made it could enjoy exclusivity. See id at 21-22.
125 Id. at 20-21.
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bilateral agreements between European countries emerged, protecting national
copyright owners in foreign countries.126
The nineteenth century saw the emergence of the concept of a universal
copyright law. The existing bilateral agreements only offered protection for
non-national works, but in all substantive respects there were considerable
differences between the respective national laws. The disparity between the
national laws, with the resultant confusion and uncertainty, gave rise to the
notion that it was necessary to create an international copyright law, which
unified and standardized the substantive aspects of the various national laws.127
This universal copyright law accorded with the natural law perception of
copyright as the property of the author, thus trumping any positive national
law.128 Indeed, the Berne Convention institutionalized the conception of
copyright as a property right, and this conception was subsequently adopted in
all contracting countries. 29 Along with conceptualizing copyright as a property
right, the need for certain limitations in favor of public use of works was
acknowledged, albeit in a rather restricted manner. 30 Finally, in 1967 the
recognition of the need for some limitations in favor of public use was
internationally anchored with the adoption of Article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention, according to which exceptions or limitations to the exclusive rights
should comply with three conditions, known as the "three-step test." The three
conditions are as follows: (1) the exception should be limited to certain special
cases; (2) it should not conflict with normal exploitation of the work; and (3) it
should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.
The "three-step test" thereby unified and standardized the national limitations
which were previously characterized by considerable discrepancies. In some
countries the limitations were widely drawn while others preferred a narrower
scheme.' 3' It should, however, be borne in mind that the "three-step test" does
not specify the minimum standard, but rather the maximum. In other words,
party countries are not compelled to adopt limitations to copyright at all,
126 Id. at 42-43.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 42.
129 Ricketson and Ginsburg note that in 1878 an International Literary Association was
established in Paris. This association prepared preliminary guidelines, which later on served as
the basic principles of the Berne Convention. One of these principles was the acknowledgement
of the copyright as a property right that must be protected by law. See id. at 49-50. Accordingly,
eight years later, the Berne Convention executed such a principle. See Berne Convention, art. 9,
1886.
130 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, .rupra note 121, at 67-69, 756.
131 Id. at 759.
2012] 51
21
Fischman-Afori: The Evolution of Copyright Law and Inductive Speculations as to I
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2012
J. INTELL PROP. L
however in the event of limitations being adopted they should not exceed the
"three-step test" threshold.132
Moreover, the pre-Berne national copyright laws focused on vesting
exclusivity in printing books; namely, they attempted to control the duplication
and hence the dissemination of copies. The Berne Convention, for the first
time, introduced the concept of "originality" as the defining threshold for the
protected subject matter, thereby expanding the scope of exclusivity.33 The
"originality" threshold entailed protection against acts of "reproduction"-
appropriating parts of the work or producing adaptations such as translations-
for which the mere protection against duplication was no longer adequate.134
This major and substantive change in the conception of copyright law was
subsequently introduced into the British Copyright Act of 1911,135 and into the
American Copyright Act of 1909,136 although the U.S. was not a party to the
Berne Convention at that time. The Berne Convention, therefore, not only
introduced significant changes into the fundamentals of copyright law, but also
simultaneously disseminated them, institutionalizing them globally and giving
them an inherent character.
The Berne Convention was the harbinger of the current treaties era, in
which international agreements establish and define the various substantive
national copyright arrangements adopted by each country. The Berne
Convention was occasionally revised,13 and in 1994, by virtue of the TRIPS
agreement, was finally adopted as the required starting point for all national
copyright laws.' 38 The basic conception of copyright as a property right and the
narrow "three-step test" as a maximum threshold and the concept of originality
defining the subject matter were, thus, further anchored as "inherent" concepts
132 Id. at 759-60.
133 Berne Convention, art. 2, 1886; Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 132; KAPLAN & MLLER, supra
note 3, at 24-25. See also Oren Bracha, The Ideolog ofAuthorship Revisited Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early Ameeican Copyight, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 201, 209-24 (2008).
134 In its early stage, the right of reproduction in American law was limited to grant of control
over the reprinting of works, and there was no exclusivity over reproduction through derivatives.
See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 Cas. 201 (1853) in which the court held that a translation of the seminal
book "Uncle Tom's Cabin" into German was not an infringement since it was beyond copyright
exclusivity. For the later expansion of the right of reproduction, after the launch of the Berne
Convention, see Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899).
"s British Copyright Act, art. 2, 1911. See DAVIES, sfpra note 3, at 38.
136 US Copyright Act of 1909, art. 1. See also KAPLAN & MILLER, supra note 3, at 30.
137 The Berne Convention was revised and amended in 1896, 1908, 1914, 1928, 1948, 1967,
1971, and 1979.
138 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1196 (1994), art. 2 [hereinafter TRIPS].
[Vol. 19:231252
22
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol19/iss2/2
THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT LAl 25
by the TRIPS agreement. Yet, as explained at the beginning of Part II, these
"inherent" conceptions lie at the core of the current copyright wars, because
they perpetuate the supremacy of the private economic interests over public
interests. Moreover, the restrictive "three-step test" for limitations to copyright
was specifically reinforced by a provision in the TRIPS agreement.'39
Therefore, not only is there a gradual tendency in international agreements to
reinforce copyright by way of the proprietary and originality measurements;
there is also no possibility of developing a parallel system of limitations to
copyright due to the restrictive contours of the "three-step test" as a
standardized ceiling.'# It should be noted that the fair use doctrine, codified in
the U.S. Copyright Act,141 may be viewed as being in conflict with the "three-
step test," and as a result it has not been widely accepted.142
These historical insights are the basis of the analysis below, concerning
projections for the evolution of copyright law in the near future.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT LAW, THE COMMON LAW MECHANISM,
AND LEGAL INDUCTIVE SPECULATION
The evolution of copyright law discloses a pattern in which core interests
have been engaged in an ongoing, perennial struggle: Authors seek both
economic benefits and personal recognition, economic entrepreneurs seek to
enhance profits, and the general public seeks to benefit from both an
abundance of works and maximum accessibility to works and information.
Indeed, a close look at the interests operating in modem society indicates that
in reality they represent the same basic core interests, and that the copyright
wars of the new digital-technological age are battles over the same basic
interests.143
Digital technology has changed many aspects of the creative realm, from the
way in which works are created, to the way in which works are consumed, and
139 Id. art. 13.
140 The three-step test was interpreted by the WTO panel discussing s.110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel: United States-Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R. The panel's conclusion was that the exception
to copyright set by Article 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act was violating the three-step test
scheme.
141 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
142 See, e.g., WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Digital Environment, prepared by S. Ricketson, SCCR/9/7 at pp. 67-70. For the presentation of
such an argument, see also Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 114-23 (2000).
143 FEATHER, supra note 3, at 9. See also Fischman-Afori, supra note 10.
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to the supply and demand of works.144 Nonetheless, the core interests that
shaped early copyright law have not disappeared in the technological age. This
does not mean that the internet has no implications for the law,145 but rather
that its influence on the development of copyright law is expressed in all of the
structural and competing core interests, and is elaborated along with many other
factors. As such, for as long as copyright law continues to evolve within the
framework of the common law, the impact of the internet will not be
revolutionary. The context in which the core interests are at battle is now a
digital one, but the interests have remained basically the same.
Examination of the development of copyright law discloses another insight.
The major developments in the evolution of copyright law-those that could be
identified as evolutionary "leaps" creating a "paradigm shift"-have all been the
result of national or international legislation.146 The early privilege system was
replaced by the Statute of Anne in 1709, which was the first modem copyright
law and which established a status quo based on new, different approaches. In
constructing this new stage, the core interests were defined or even
conceptualized, and the bitter debate over what constitutes an appropriate
balance between public and private interests has persisted ever since. This was
followed by the Berne Convention which represented a major step in the
evolution of copyright law. For the first time it defined the relevant players in
the world of copyright as the powerful organizations which were constantly
shaping and reshaping the internal and international political and economic
map. This definition assisted in overcoming local nationally-defined
formulations of the balance of interests. In that respect, the Berne Convention
constitutes the original sin which gave rise to the current copyright wars, since it
not only perpetuated the previous conceptualizations of copyright as a property
right, but further tilted the balance in favor of the private interests by
broadening the protected subject matter through the concept of originality and
restricting the scope of legitimate limitations.
144 See SLEVIN, supra note 5.
145 For the approach that the internet has not changed basic legal concepts with respect to
rights, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207.
For a broader view according to which the "underlying substance of our socioeconomic system
remains largely the same" despite profound changes in the practice of modern life, see
CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A SCEPTICAL VIEW 1 (2002).
146 A somewhat similar analysis was proposed with respect to the development of science.
Normal science is based on incremental improvements, while occasionally there are
breakthroughs of revolutionary science, which presents "abrupt jumps" creating a "paradigm
shift." See THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); see also
Robert Cooter, Matring into Normal Sdence: The Efect of Empirical Legal Studes on Law and Economics,
2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1475, 1476.
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These insights assist in the attempt to predict the future of copyright law by
way of inductive methodology. Legal induction attempts to identify the process
of the development of law, and the major reasons for its change over the course
of time. Drawing the line between the major turning points in its evolution
enables an attempt to predict the course it is likely to take in the future.147
Therefore, since the core clashing interests have not changed much, and
conceptualization of basic copyright measurements were concretized and
anchored in a regime of international treaties, any significant change granting
greater clout and expression for the public's interest will occur by way of a
legislative development, which-if it were to succeed-would represent another
significant conceptual "jump" or a "paradigm shift." However, current trends
in both local and international legislative initiatives do not provide any basis for
thinking that copyright law will move in that direction. As such, any change will
only be mediated by the gradual common law mechanism.148 This kind of
evolutionary process, on a case-by-case basis, will not spawn any major
reconceptualization of the clashing interests.149 The copyright wars may be
doomed to be an ongoing battle of attrition. While this does not negate the
possibility of any change in the balance of the clashing interests, it means that
any change is likely to be minor, and achieved through the slow and gradual
process of common law.
Another prediction relates to possible developments in the global political
economy. As explained, change will be achieved through a shift in the direction
of international legislation, but the public interest lobby has not had much
success in making its imprint in the international bodies of WIPO and WTO. 50
It would seem that public interest advocates need to seek out another strategy,
which might take the form of an attempt to influence local governments to
147 Scott Brewer, Exemplat Reasoning: Semanics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of LegalArgument
by Analogy, 109 HARv. L. REv. 923, 926, 931-33 (1996).
148 In that respect, it should be noted that the efficiency and morality of the common law
mechanism is debated. SeeJody S. Kraus, Transparenq and Determinag in Common LawAdjudicaion:
A Philosophical Defense of Explanatoy Economic Anavsi, 93 VA. L. REv. 287 (2007); JuLEs L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLES: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL
THEORY.
149 It should be noted that the common law mechanism enables the development of new
concepts for protecting the contents of intellectual property. For a thorough review of this
function of common law, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmac Incrementaksm of Common Law
Intellectual Properny, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1543 (2010). Even so, this evolution is still gradual and does
not necessarily present a shift in basic concepts of the relevant intellectual property law, but
rather a supplementary legal measure.
150 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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ensure adequate representation of the entire complex of interests in WIPO or
WTO, or in the form of an overriding international instrument.
The second strategy-an attempt to create a competing international
instrument-was adopted by UNESCO (the United Nations Education Science
and Culture Organization) in 2005 when it created the Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression (Convention
on Cultural Diversity).15 This convention was initiated by Canada, France, and
other developed countries in order to establish an international force to counter
the WTO and to introduce a strong pro-public interest approach.152 This new
convention was initiated against the background of the failure to introduce a
"cultural exception" into the WTO agreements, which would have allowed
countries to exempt local cultural products from the agreement in order to
protect them from the downsides of globalization.15 The U.S. opposed the
adoption of the Convention on Cultural Diversity on several grounds, including
its fear that the new convention would actually restrict local freedom.154 The
main fear of the U.S., however, was that the Convention on Cultural Diversity
would be used as a means for circumventing the WTO agreements under the
flag of an overriding principle of "free exchange and circulation of ideas." 5 5
Therefore, the U.S. demanded the addition of an article stressing the imperative
of complying with prior international agreements. Ultimately, the Convention
on Cultural Diversity included a sophisticated clause, defining both the principle
of non-derogation from prior treaties, along with a commitment to mutual
supportiveness and non-subordination to the principles of prior treaties. 56 The
151 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Res. 41,
Records of the General Conference, 33d Sess., Oct. 3-21, 2007, 33 C/Res. 41, at 83, available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001428/142825e.pdf.
152 Mira Burri, Cultural Diversity as a Concept of Global Law: Origins, Evolution and Prospects, 2
DIvERsYTY 1059, 1059-63 (2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1585139 (last
visited Apr. 15, 2012); Michael Hahn, A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and
International Trade Law, 9 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 515, 516-20 (2006); Christoph Beat Graber, The New
UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A Counterbalance to the IFTO?, 9 J. INT'L EcON. L. 553,
553-54 (2006).
153 Christopher M. Bruner, Culture, Soverrgnty, and Hol/wood: UNESCO and the Future of Trade in
Cultural Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 351, 368-69 (2008) (referencing a "cultural
exception").
154 United Nations Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 33d Sess.,
Proceedings, Vol. 2, p. 506, sec. 79.29 (2007).
1ss Id at sec. 79.3.
156 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression, Oct.
20, 2005, Article 20, available at http://unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf.




Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol19/iss2/2
THE E VOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT LAW
result is that this clause may operate as a block to the broadening of the WTO
agreements in the future, while avoiding interference with existing
agreements. 57 At this time, 117 countries are parties to the Convention on the
Diversity of Cultural Expression, including Canada, all of the European Union
countries, the countries of South America and many Asian countries.158
The question is how parties to the Convention on Cultural Diversity, such as
Canada, who also initiated the Convention, could simultaneously have adopted
the ACTA. Without answering this question, an apposite realpolitik observation
is that the strategy of creating a countervailing international instrument, in the
form of an international institution to counter WTO, has thus far not proven
successful. This may indicate that in the near future the first strategy-that of
attempting to influence national governments to stress a more balanced
approach internationally-should be preferred. Such an attempt, if made,
might well bring some concrete achievements to the public interest sector in its
400-year war.
VI. SUMMARY
Any attempt to predict the future of copyright law would be speculative
since the law is in a state of flux and in crisis. The crisis is reflected by multiple
factors: Cases being litigated in the courts are challenging the old legal models
with contemporary ones and legislative initiatives are being introduced
nationally and internationally in attempt to meet the challenge posed by new
industries to the existing, traditional industries. We are confronting an
avalanche of lively polemic and public discourse as a result. Under these
circumstances, outlining the historical development of copyright law may be of
1. Parties recognize that they shall perform in good faith their obligations
under this Convention and all other treaties to which they are parties.
Accordingly, without subordinating this Convention to any other treaty,
(a) they shall foster mutual supportiveness between this Convention and
the other treaties to which they are parties; and
(b) when interpreting and applying the other treaties to which they are
parties or when entering into other international obligations, Parties
shall take into account the relevant provisions of this Convention.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and
obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are
parties.
157 Keith Acheson & Christopher Maule, Convention on Cultural Diversity, 28 J. CULTURAL EcON.
243, 253 (2004).
158 Unesco.org, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&1anguage=E&order=a
1pha (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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assistance in revealing its evolutionary process or revealing its underlying DNA.
No doubt, this methodology may be critiqued as being tautological, as are all
inductive assumptions. Moreover, such an outline could be criticized as being
overly broad and abstract-as having been painted with too thick a brush.
Finally, its determination of the main historical junctions is suspect of being
tautological by its choice of the points which best fit the future prediction.
Responding to these legitimate criticisms, I will call forth Judge Holmes's
aphorism, according to which "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 59
The four hundred years of evolution of copyright law indicates that, from its
inception, copyright law has served as an arena for a struggle between clashing
interests: private against public and economic against societal. These core
interests were developed, becoming more sophisticated in time. However, the
development of the surrounding settings of copyright law, spearheaded by
technology, did not eliminate the basic clash of interests, although it did
introduce new elements that further complicated it. Therefore, as long as the
same nexus of interests remains relevant, there is no reason to believe that a
totally new legal regime is likely to appear.
Moreover, history teaches us that major paradigm shifts concerning basic
concepts in copyright law were achieved through legislation, nationally or
internationally, while common law courts serve as a means for gradually
developing those basic concepts. In the current copyright crises, the basic
notion of copyright as a property right, along with its scope and possible
limitations, is facing a challenge. Internet intermediaries, seeking to streamline
dissemination of works, serve the public's interest along with their own
economic interests. The mass diffusion of works indicates the need for a
change in the exclusivity rules, for example by allowing "opt out" mechanisms
or by using concepts of mens rea for liability, or allowing more room for
exceptions and limitations to copyright. Developments of this kind, however,
are being blocked by obligations under international treaties, the first of which
was the Berne Convention. Therefore, significant developments and changes in
the fundamentals of copyright law will require acknowledgement by
international law. Achieving such an end in the current political and economic
climate seems almost impossible. Nevertheless, a paradigm shift could be
introduced into the various international instruments if national governments
were to serve as agents for social change. In other words, if national
governments could be persuaded, either directly through protest or indirectly
through influential entities, that a pragmatic tilt of the balance in favor of the
15 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
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public and societal interests is needed, there is room to hope that copyright will
begin to evolve in new (and positive) directions.
29
Fischman-Afori: The Evolution of Copyright Law and Inductive Speculations as to I
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2012
30
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol19/iss2/2
